问询函监管能改善关键审计事项的模板化披露吗

Can Regulatory Inquiry Letters Mitigate the Standardized Disclosure of Key Audit Matters

摘要

以我国问询函监管制度与关键审计事项披露为背景,以2020-2023年沪深A股上市公司为研究样本,运用文本分析法,实证检验问询函监管对关键审计事项模板化披露的治理效应.研究发现,问询函监管显著降低关键审计事项的文本相似度,缓解模板化披露问题;机制检验表明,问询函监管通过提升审计风险与缓解信息不对称两条路径发挥作用;进一步分析显示,审计师变更正向调节问询函监管与关键审计事项相似度之间的关系;问询函监管对关键审计事项披露的改善具有长期效应;且降低关键审计事项纵向文本相似度,进一步提升审计质量.

Abstract

This study examines the impact of inquiry letter regulation on the disclosure of Key Audit Matters (KAMs) in China, using a sample of A share listed firms on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2020 to 2023 and applying textual analysis methods. The results show that inquiry letter regulation significantly reduces the textual similarity of KAM disclosures, mitigates boilerplate reporting, and improves the informational value of audit reports. Mechanism analysis indicates that this effect operates through two channels: increased audit risk and reduced information asymmetry. Further analysis reveals that auditors positively moderate the relationship between inquiry letter regulation and KAM similarity, and that inquiry letter regulation has a persistent effect in improving KAM disclosures. Moreover, the reduction in KAM similarity further contributes to enhanced audit quality.

关键词

问询函监管 / 关键审计事项 / 模板化披露 / 文本相似度 / 审计质量 / 信息不对称

Key words

inquiry letter regulation / key audit matters / boilerplate disclosure / text similarity / audit quality / information asymmetry

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