企业风险偏好对智能网联汽车合作研发影响的演化博弈研究——基于双层网络视角

Evolutionary Game Study on the Impact of Enterprise Risk Appetite on Intelligent Networked Vehicle Cooperative R & D——Based on a Two-layer Network Perspective

摘要

本文在考虑企业动态风险偏好的基础上，构建新能源汽车企业与科技企业间的双层网络演化博弈模型，考察合作收益分配、投机收益、风险系数及政府补贴等关键因素对双方合作研发策略演化的影响，探究智能网联汽车市场跨界合作的内在演化动力。结果表明：风险系数对企业合作意愿的负向抑制效应最为显著；新能源汽车企业因在合作中占据主导地位，即使在较低的收益分配系数下仍能维持较高的合作意愿；投机收益虽在短期内诱发非合作行为，但长期稳定的收益预期反而能小幅提升整体合作率。政府补贴的调节作用存在显著异质性，科技企业对补贴更为敏感，在低补贴情境下其合作意愿波动较大。从组合机制来看，风险因素的支配作用强于补贴，政府补贴仅在高风险环境下才显现出明显的正向调节效应。此外，企业实力差异决定了合作驱动力，新能源汽车企业更依赖技术突破，而科技企业更依赖政策支持。本文揭示了智能网联汽车跨界协同创新的动力演化机制，为政府制定精准化创新激励政策提供理论依据，也为异质性企业合作策略选择提供实践参考。

Abstract

To promote sustainable growth and in-depth cross-border cooperation in the intelligent connected vehicle market, the dynamic risk preferences of enterprises were taken into account. A two-layer network model between new energy vehicle enterprises and technology enterprises was constructed. Evolutionary game theory and multi-dimensional simulation methods were applied to simulate and analyze the effects of key factors, including cooperative benefit distribution, speculative benefits, risk coefficient, and government subsidies, on the evolution of the cooperative R & D strategies of both parties. It is shown that the most significant negative effect on enterprises’ cooperative willingness is exerted by the risk coefficient. A dominant position in cooperation is held by new energy vehicle enterprises, and their cooperative willingness is maintained even under a relatively low benefit distribution coefficient. Although non-cooperative behavior is induced by speculative benefits in the short term, the overall cooperation rate is eventually slightly enhanced by stable long-term return expectations. Significant heterogeneity is observed in the moderating effect of government subsidies. Technology enterprises are more sensitive to subsidies, and greater fluctuation in their cooperative willingness is exhibited under low-subsidy scenarios. From the perspective of the combined mechanism, a stronger dominant effect is exerted by risk factors than by subsidies, and a significant positive moderating effect of government subsidies is only manifested under high-risk environments. Moreover, the driving force of cooperation is determined by enterprise strength differences. Technology breakthroughs are more relied upon by new energy vehicle enterprises, while policy support is more relied upon by technology enterprises. In this paper, the dynamic evolution mechanism of cross-border collaborative innovation in intelligent connected vehicles is revealed. A theoretical basis is provided for governments to formulate precise innovation incentive policies, and a practical reference is also offered for heterogeneous enterprises to make cooperative strategy choices in complex environments.

关键词

智能网联汽车 / 跨界合作 / 动态风险偏好 / 演化博弈 / 复杂网络 / 政府补贴 / 企业异质性 / 风险系数

Key words

intelligent networked vehicle / cross-border cooperation / dynamic risk appetite / evolutionary game / complex network / government subsidy / firm heterogeneity / risk coefficient

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基金资助

国家自然科学基金项目(72204001)

国家社会科学基金青年项目(24CGL046)

国家社会科学基金后期资助项目(24FGLB055)

安徽省高校优秀青年科研项目(2023AH030035)