A certain amount of human capital is the foundation and prerequisite for promoting rural revitalization. However, with the rapid advancement of China’s urbanization process, a large number of rural populations have migrated to urban areas, resulting in an increasingly severe problem of rural population deficit and talent exodus. In fact, urbanization requires a continued transfer of the rural labor force to cities, whereas rural revitalization emphasizes the return of talent to rural areas for development. The two strategies therefore present a certain “contradiction” in terms of the spatial allocation of labor force elements. From the perspective of rural revitalization, the loss of the rural labor force, particularly the outflow of young and middle-aged workers, not only weakens the population base for rural economic development but even triggers a series of economic and social problems, such as “hollow villages,” “aging agriculture,” and “landless farmers.” This directly hinders the realization of the rural revitalization strategy. Therefore, to achieve the goal of rural revitalization while continuously advancing urbanization, it is first necessary to reverse the trend of labor flowing one-way labor flow from rural to urban areas and establish smooth two-way channels for labor migration between urban and rural areas. The return of migrant workers to their hometowns is an important manifestation of this two-way flow of labor force and is of great significance for achieving the strategic goal of rural revitalization.
From the perspective of social capital, this article focuses on the impact of clan power on migrant workers returning to their hometowns. Based on the 2018 China Labor Force Dynamics Survey (CLDS) data and theoretical analysis, the influence of clan power on the return of migrant workers was empirically examined, as was the mechanism through which clan power affects this return. The research results show that clan power significantly promotes migrant workers returning to their hometowns. The greater the clan’s influence in the place of origin, the more likely it is that migrant workers will return home. Hometown identity and special trust are two important pathways through which clan power influences migrant workers to return to their hometowns. On the one hand, clan power can strengthen migrant workers’ cultural identity towards the traditional customs and social etiquette of their hometowns, as well as their sense of group identity when participating in the public affairs of their hometowns. This strengthens, thereby strengthening their sense of hometown identity and encouraging their return. On the other hand, clan power can enhance familiarity and trust between migrant workers and their neighbors, other villagers, and local residents, thus enhancing special trust towards villagers and promoting their return. Heterogeneity analysis indicates that clan power mainly influences the return of male migrant workers and those in monopolistic clan network structures, as well as those in mountainous villages. First, male migrant workers are more likely than female migrant workers to be influenced by clan cultures such as “raising sons for old-age support” and “preferring sons over daughters,” and thus choose to return to their hometowns. Second, clan power under monopolistic clan network structures has a stronger promotional effect on the return of migrant workers than in villages with non-monopolistic clan network structures. Third, migrant workers in mountainous regions are more likely to be influenced by clan cultures such as “ returning to ancestral roots” and “falling leaves return to their roots” than those in non-mountainous areas, and thus choose to return home.
Compared with previous studies, the marginal contributions of this paper are reflected in the following aspects: (1) It is the first to explore and confirm that the power of the clan can have a positive effect on encouraging migrant workers returning to their hometowns. This not only enriches the existing research on the economic and social effects of clan power, but also expands the scope of research on migrant worker returns. (2) Based on theoretical analysis, this study empirically examines the influence of clan power on migrant workers’ decisions to return to their hometowns, and investigates the mechanisms at play enhancing the comprehensiveness and credibility of the research. (3) It reminds policymakers that in the process of optimizing the spatial allocation of the urban and rural labor force, they should fully recognize the important impact of clan power on migrant workers’ decisions to return to their hometowns, thereby leveraging the complementary role of the informal institution of the clan alongside informal institutions such as policies and regulations.
The research in this paper verifies the important role of the clan as an informal institution in promoting migrant workers’ return to their hometowns, providing a useful reference for establishing a two-way flow mechanism for urban and rural labor force and advancing rural revitalization.
CHENB K, CHENS Y. Flowing social capital: can traditional clan culture affect migrants’ employment in modern society?[J]. Economic Research Journal,2018,53(3):35-49.
[3]
郭云南,姚洋.宗族网络与农村劳动力流动[J].管理世界,2013,29(3):69-81.
[4]
GUOY N, YAOY. The lineage networks and the migration of the labor forces[J]. Journal of Management World, 2013,29(3):69-81.
ZHANGJ P, HUANGJ, WANGJ H, et al. Return migration and the Hukou registration reform in Chinese cities[J]. Economic Research Journal,2020,55(7):175-190.
WANGY, LIUL. How can migrant workers returning home for entrepreneurship promote common prosperity of farmers in rural areas?[J]. Chinese Rural Economy,2022,38(9):44-62.
[13]
YUL, WANGY R, LIM. The emergence of counter-urbanization in China: can it be a pathway for rural revitalization?[J]. Habitat International,2024,144:102998.
XIANGY. Zuyin competition: a meso-mechanism to understand the operation of rural clans in China[J]. Journal of Huazhong Agricultural University (Social Sciences Edition),2022,42(1):149-161.
[19]
GREIFA, TABELLINIG. Cultural and institutional bifurcation: China and Europe compared[J]. The American Economic Review,2010,100(2):135-140.
[20]
ZHAOY H. The role of migrant networks in labor migration: the case of China[J]. Contemporary Economic Policy,2003,21(4):500-511.
[21]
GRANOVETTERM S. The strength of weak ties[J]. American Journal of Sociology,1973,78(6):1360-1380.
ZHAIX W. Revisiting the contributions, limitations and theoretical legacies of the differential mode of association [J]. Social Sciences in China,2009,30(3):152-158.
HUANGZ, YUY Y, JIAM. Repay hometown to promote innovation? An empirical study based on the hometown identity of senior executives[J]. Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management,2022,36(5):111-129.
HUANGS L, WUY L. General trust, particular trust, and entrepreneurship from trust structure perspective: role of regional trust pattern[J]. Research on Economics and Management,2023,44(11):104-124.
ZHAOJ Y, LIX D. Particular trust or universal trust: based on the influence of social trust on enterprises’ trans-regional investment[J]. Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics,2022,44(8):112-126.
[44]
郭萌萌,雷文杰.地区间信任与流动人口创业[J].当代经济科学,2025,47(4):65-79.
[45]
GUOM M, LEIW J. Inter-regional trust and migrant entrepreneurship[J]. Modern Economic Science,2025,47(4):65-79.
LIR B. The governance of rural collective action participation: evidence and explanation from the clan network[J]. Comparative Economic & Social Systems,2021,37(5):129-138.
[48]
王宇锋.宗族结构、村庄规模与村民收入[J].南开经济研究,2010,26(3):64-72.
[49]
WANGY F. Clan, size and average income in villages: evidence from China[J]. Nankai Economic Studies,2010,26(3):64-72.