考虑乘客补贴敏感异质性的网约车平台定向补贴策略

Targeted Subsidy Strategies for Ride-Hailing Platforms Considering Heterogeneous Passenger Sensitivity to Subsidy

摘要

目前网约车服务凭借经济性和便捷性，市场规模快速扩张，网约车平台在何种情境下应采用统一补贴策略，又在何时转向定向补贴策略以最大化其利润，是一个重要的研究课题。针对网约车平台通过发放优惠券补贴乘客的实际情况，探讨网约车平台的补贴策略选择。根据对补贴额度的敏感程度将乘客群体分为两类：补贴高敏感群体和补贴低敏感群体。在构建网约车平台不补贴和统一补贴策略模型的基础上，研究定向补贴策略，运用逆向归纳法得到平台的最优决策。通过数值算例对 3 种策略的平台决策和最优利润进行比较分析。研究发现：平台的补贴额度和佣金率呈正相关关系；在 3 种策略中，平台均有可能实现最大利润，补贴高敏感乘客的敏感程度决定是否补贴乘客，而采取何种补贴策略要综合考虑补贴高敏感群体的占比和补贴敏感系数。此外，深入探讨平台不同策略对社会福利的影响，为平台制定补贴策略提供参考与建议。

Abstract

With the rapid expansion of ride-hailing services driven by their affordability and convenience, it is important to determine the conditions under which platforms should adopt uniform subsidy strategies and targeted subsidy strategies to maximize profits. Motivated by the common practice of offering coupons to passengers, this study investigates subsidy strategy selection for a ride-hailing platform. Passengers are divided into two categories according to their sensitivity to the subsidy amount: a highly subsidy-sensitive group and a low subsidy-sensitive group. On the basis of constructing the game models for no-subsidy and uniform-subsidy strategies, a strategy of targeted subsidy is further examined, and the optimal decision of the platform is obtained by backward induction. Numerical examples are used to compare platform decisions and the optimal profit under the three strategies. Results show that the subsidy amount is positively correlated with the commission rate. Any of the three strategies may yield the maximum profit. Passenger subsidy decisions depend on the sensitivity of the highly subsidy-sensitive group, while the choice of subsidy strategy jointly depends on the proportion of this group and its subsidy sensitivity coefficient. In addition, the impact of different strategies of the platform on social welfare is deeply discussed, providing managerial insights for platform subsidy design.

关键词

网约车平台 / 双边市场 / 最优策略 / 补贴

Key words

ride-hailing platform / two-sided market / optimal strategy / subsidy

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基金资助

四川省自然科学基金重点项目(2025NSFSC1928)

国家自然科学基金项目(72201175)