考虑货运公交的农村物流政府补贴策略

Subsidy Strategy Analysis for Rural Logistics with Freight Bus Services

摘要

为降低农村货运公交物流运营成本、提升补贴效率，进而推动农村经济发展，本文探究政府最优补贴策略及其关键影响因素。构建以政府为主导、物流服务商为追随的 Stackelberg 博弈模型，对比无政府补贴、基础设施补贴和运营机制补贴 3 种情形。分析消费者价格敏感度、地区经济溢出效应、补贴力度等变量对各方决策的作用机理。结果表明，基础设施补贴会扩大两类服务商利润差距，但运营机制补贴下货运公交利润始终更高；补贴力度较小时，运营补贴效率更优，然而补贴力度过大易导致政府负债；传统物流服务商在价格敏感度低、补贴少的地区靠基础设施补贴获利，而在价格敏感度高、补贴多的地区可从运营补贴间接受益。提出的分区域精准补贴、欠发达地区优先运营补贴策略，填补了物流补贴与乡村振兴的理论断层，为农村物流可持续发展提供参考。

Abstract

To address the high operating costs in rural freight bus logistics, and thereby improve subsidy efficiency and promote rural economic development, this study investigates the optimal government subsidy strategies and their key influencing factors. A Stackelberg game model is constructed with the government as the leader and logistics service providers as the followers. Three scenarios are compared: no subsidy, infrastructure subsidy, and operational mechanism subsidy. The influence of consumer price sensitivity, regional economic spillover effects, and subsidy intensity on the decisions of each party is then analyzed. Results show that the infrastructure subsidy widens the profit gap between the two types of logistics service providers, while freight bus operators consistently achieve higher profits under the operational mechanism subsidy. The operational subsidy is more efficient when the subsidy intensity is low, whereas excessive intensity can lead to government fiscal deficits. Conventional logistics providers benefit from the infrastructure subsidy in regions with low price sensitivity and limited funding, but can indirectly benefit from the operational subsidy in regions with high price sensitivity and greater subsidy allocations. Based on these findings, region-specific targeted subsidies are recommended, with priority given to operational subsidies in underdeveloped areas. This study fills the theoretical gap between logistics subsidies and rural revitalization, providing references for the sustainable development of rural logistics.

关键词

货运公交 / 农村物流 / 政府补贴 / 博弈论

Key words

freight bus / rural logistics / government subsidy / game theory

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基金资助

国家社会科学基金重大项目(23&ZD049)