政府采购招投标中围标串标行为的博弈分析
Game analysis of the behavior of government procurement bidding
政府采购是一种优化公共资源配置的机制,有助于公共资金的充分运用,也能从源头控制腐败行为。当前,我国政府采购主要侧重公开招标模式,如果竞争环境公开透明,资源可以得到合理分配,避免出现资源浪费问题。由于市场各主体对政府采购项目的青睐度高,所以投标者较多。但是,我国在招投标市场的监督上,存在的问题颇多,导致围标串标行为频繁出现。鉴于此,本文以政府采购招投标为切入点,对政府采购招投标中围标串标行为进行博弈分析,并结合现存问题,以电子招投标建设为例,提出切实可行的应对之策,促进招投标事业的健康发展。
Government procurement is a mechanism to optimize the allocation of public resources, which is conducive to the full use of public funds, and can also control corruption from the source. At present, China’s government procurement mainly focuses on the open bidding mode. If the competitive environment is open and transparent, resources can be reasonably allocated to avoid the problem of waste of resources. Due to the high favor of government procurement projects, there are more bidders. However, there are many problems in the supervision of bidding market, which leads to the frequent occurrence of bidding behavior. In view of this, this paper takes the government procurement bidding as the starting point, analyzes the game analysis of the bidding and bidding, combined with the existing problems, takes the electronic bidding construction as an example, puts forward feasible countermeasures to promote the healthy development of the bidding cause.
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