博弈论视角下的基层政府角色分析——以山东省淄博市郭家村为例

Analysis of the role of grass-roots government from the perspective of game theory—a case study of Guojia Village, Zibo City, Shandong Province

摘要

乡镇基层政府作为社会治理中的最后一公里，既是国家的政权代理人，也是基层自治组织的管理者，是联系国家和基层群众的重要桥梁。基层政府如何在资本下乡中扮演好自身角色，履行职能对于促进当地发展，实现乡村振兴具有重大意义。本文以山东省淄博市郭家村为例，通过田野调查的方法，运用“智猪博弈”“囚徒困境”模型对郭家村村民和街道办事处进行博弈策略与对策分析，得出了基层政府应该扮演好“推动者”“监督者”“维护者”“服务者”角色的结论。

Abstract

As the last mile in social governance, township grassroots governments serve as both agents of state power and managers of grassroots autonomous organizations, serving as important bridges connecting the state and grassroots communities. How grassroots governments can play a good role in capital to rural areas and fulfill their functions is of great significance for promoting local development and achieving rural revitalization. This article takes Guojia Village in Zibo City, Shandong Province as an example. Through field investigation, the “smart pig game” and “prisoner’s dilemma” models are used to analyze the game strategies and countermeasures of the villagers and street offices in Guojia Village. The conclusion is that grassroots governments should play the roles of “promoters”, “supervisors”, “maintainers” and “service provider” well.

关键词

基层政府 / 博弈论 / 囚徒困境 / 智猪博弈 / 角色定位

Key words

grass-roots government / game theory / prisoner’s dilemma / smart pig game / role positioning

参考文献

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基金资助

国家社科基金一般项目(20BZZ049)

“资本下乡驱动下的‘乡村经营性治理’的运行机理与长效机制研究”()