基于身份加密的可变形加密方案构造

Construction of anamorphic encryption scheme based on identity-based encryption

摘要

数据通信的机密性高度依赖于密钥的安全性.传统的通信安全主要基于发送者自由假设和接收者隐私假设,但在胁迫环境下,这些假设可能会被破坏,导致消息内容被控制或者密钥泄露.针对接收者隐私假设被破坏这一问题,提出了一种基于IBE-to-CCA转换的可变形加密方案.该方案通过引入伪随机函数,将基于身份的加密方案升级为可变形加密方案,显著增强了其在密钥泄露情况下的安全性.

Abstract

The confidentiality of data communication heavily relies on the security of encryption keys. Traditional communication security is primarily based on the assumptions of sender freedom and receiver privacy. However, in certain coercive environments, these assumptions may be compromised, leading to the disclosure of message content or key leakage. To address the issue of the receiver privacy assumption being violated, this paper proposes an anamorphic encryption scheme based on IBE-to-CCA conversion. By introducing a pseudorandom function, this scheme upgrades an identity-based encryption scheme into an anamorphic encryption scheme, significantly enhancing its security in the event of key leakage.

关键词

可变形加密 / IBE-to-CCA转换 / 隐私保护 / 身份加密 / 伪随机函数

Key words

anamorphic encryption / IBE-to-CCA conversion / privacy protection / identity-based encryption / pseudorandom function

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基金资助

国家自然科学基金面上项目(61972124)

浙江省自然科学基金杭州联合基金重点项目(LHZSZ24F020002)